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ABSTRACT
From the moment Donald Trump was elected president, critics have anguished over a breakdown 
in constitutional norms.  History demonstrates, however, that constitutional norms are perpetually 
in flux.  The principal source of instability is not that these unwritten rules can be destroyed by 
politicians who deny their legitimacy, their validity, or their value.  Rather, the principal source of 
instability is that constitutional norms can be decomposed—dynamically interpreted and applied 
in ways that are held out as compliant but end up limiting their capacity to constrain the conduct 
of government officials.
This Article calls attention to that latent instability and, in so doing, begins to taxonomize and 
theorize the structure of constitutional norm change.  We explore some of the different modes in 
which unwritten norms break down in our constitutional system and the different dangers and 
opportunities associated with each.  Moreover, we argue that under certain plausible conditions, 
it will be more worrisome when norms are subtly revised than when they are openly flouted.  This 
somewhat paradoxical argument suggests that many commentators have been misjudging our 
current moment: President Trump’s flagrant defiance of norms may not be as big a threat to our 
constitutional democracy as the more complex deterioration of norms underway in other institutions. 
AUTHORS
Josh Chafetz is a Professor of Law at Cornell Law School.  David Pozen is a Professor of Law at Columbia 
Law School.  This Article was prepared for the UCLA Law Review’s February 2018 symposium on The 
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INTRODUCTION 
From the moment Donald Trump was elected president, critics have 
anguished over a breakdown in constitutional norms.  Commentators of all 
stripes agree that “Trump’s flouting of norms . . . has become a defining feature 
of his presidency,”1 perhaps even its “most consequential aspect.”2  New 
watchdog groups3 and media projects4 have been established to highlight the 
importance of unwritten rules and conventions for democratic governance, 
and to monitor breaches.  “Suddenly,” a New Yorker column remarks, “all we 
hear about is ‘norms’— . . . norms violated, norms overthrown, norms thrown 
back in the faces of their normalcy.  Not since ‘Cheers’ went off the air, back in 
the nineties, have we heard so much about Norms.”5 
Concerns about a breakdown in constitutional norms long predate the 
Trump presidency, however.  Allegations of norm violations were a staple of 
the Franklin Roosevelt6 and Richard Nixon7 administrations, for example, and 
  
1. Emily Bazelon, How Do We Contend With Trump’s Defiance of ‘Norms’?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(July 11, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/magazine/how-do-we-contend-
with-trumps-defiance-of-norms.html; see also, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Will Donald Trump 
Destroy the Presidency?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2017/10/will-donald-trump-destroy-the-presidency/537921 
[https://perma.cc/H4EV-9KRK] (“Donald Trump is a norm-busting president without 
parallel in American history.”). 
2. Michael Grunwald, Donald Trump Is a Consequential President. Just Not in the Ways You 
Think., POLITICO (Dec. 30, 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/12/30/ 
rating-donald-trump-year-one-2017-216199 [https://perma.cc/DAZ6-XX8Y] (“The most 
consequential aspect of President Trump—like the most consequential aspect of 
Candidate Trump—has been his relentless shattering of norms . . . .”); see also, e.g., 
Matthew Cooper, Joe Biden Says Donald Trump Has Trashed ‘Norms’ and Made the World 
More Dangerous, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 17, 2017, 4:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/biden-
says-trump-doesnt-understand-governing-687185 [https://perma.cc/4XL8-F9GP] (“Biden 
argued that Trump’s ‘breaking down of norms’ of civility is more dangerous than any 
particular policy position . . . .”). 
3. See, e.g., BRIGHT LINE WATCH, http://brightlinewatch.org [https://perma.cc/Y4U9-9N3U]. 
4. See, e.g., Katerina Wright, Norms Watch: Tracking Team Trump’s Breaches of Democratic 
Traditions, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.justsecurity.org/36303/ 
normalization-watch [https://perma.cc/6ZR8-MQUX]. 
5. Adam Gopnik, Norms and Cliffs in Trump’s America, NEW YORKER (Aug. 3, 2017), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/norms-and-cliffs-in-trumps-america 
[https://perma.cc/KF7S-ZVB8].  For any readers mystified by the Cheers reference, see Norm 
Peterson, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norm_Peterson [https://perma.cc/3SM4-
MJ6N].  
6. See Julia Azari, This President Bucked Norms and Fought His Own Party. He Wasn’t 
Named Trump., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 30, 2017), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/ 
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more recently of the so-called Gingrich Revolution in the House of 
Representatives.8  Allegations of congressional norm violations have only 
intensified since the 1990s, especially from the left, as levels of polarization have 
increased and members of both parties have resorted repeatedly to 
constitutional hardball.9  By the middle of the Obama presidency, these 
uncooperative dynamics had generated “a widespread fear that the breakdown 
of certain separation-of-powers conventions [was] contributing to a 
breakdown of our system of representative government.”10  If Americans 
“periodically (re)discover that U.S. constitutional law is heavily based on 
conventions or unwritten political norms,”11 they likewise periodically 
rediscover that some of those norms are subject to radical revision. 
Following Philip Pettit, we can define informal norms as “regularities of 
behavior in a society” that do not have the status of law but that, “as a matter 
of shared awareness, most members conform to . . . , most expect others to 
approve of conformity or disapprove of non-conformity, and most are 
reinforced in this pattern of behavior by that expectation.”12  We can then 
define informal constitutional norms (hereafter constitutional norms) as 
that subset of informal norms that regulates the public behavior of actors who 
  
this-president-bucked-norms-and-fought-his-own-party-he-wasnt-named-trump 
[https://perma.cc/9TC4-8WDK]. 
7. See, e.g., Mark P. Lagon & Ross Harrison, As Disrupter in Chief, Trump Is No Nixon, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 18, 2017, 6:50 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/18/as-
disrupter-in-chief-trump-is-no-nixon [https://perma.cc/FZ6F-AJHX]; Julian E. 
Zelizer, What Is Really Unprecedented About Trump?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 27, 2017), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/what-is-really-unprecedented-
about-trump/544179 [https://perma.cc/W69N-JPYA]. 
8. See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 31–
43 (2012) (reviewing Newt Gingrich’s controversial tactics as Speaker of the House from 
1995 to 1999).  
9. See generally Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 915 (2018). 
10. David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 41 (2014); cf. E.J. 
DIONNE, JR. ET AL., ONE NATION AFTER TRUMP: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED, THE 
DISILLUSIONED, THE DESPERATE, AND THE NOT-YET DEPORTED 69–70 (2017) (arguing that 
“Trumpism has long been in gestation,” as the Republican Party “has been undercutting 
the norms of American politics for decades”). 
11. Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1165 
(2013). 
12. PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 
128 (2012); see also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of 
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (“Roughly speaking, by norms [the legal] 
literature refers to informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow 
because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, 
or both.”). 
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wield high-level governmental authority, thereby guiding and constraining 
how these actors “exercise political discretion.”13  Many such norms overlap 
with what Commonwealth theorists refer to as constitutional conventions, or 
the “‘unwritten norms of government practice’ that emerge in a decentralized 
fashion and ‘are regularly followed out of a sense of obligation but are not 
directly enforceable in court.’”14  Given that all norms, by definition, enjoy a 
wide measure of approval within the relevant community and that 
constitutional conventions are widely believed to “vindicate basic purposes of 
the constitutional system,”15 the prospect of constitutional norms becoming 
destabilized is understandably concerning. 
Yet as history demonstrates, constitutional norms are perpetually in flux.16  
The principal source of instability is not that they can be disregarded or 
denigrated by politicians who deny their legitimacy, their validity, or their 
value—although these things do sometimes happen.  Rather, the principal 
source of instability is that constitutional norms can be dynamically interpreted 
in a more or less restrictive manner, and at higher or lower levels of generality, 
and the potential for such reinterpretation puts ongoing pressure on the 
integrity of the norms and their capacity to constrain the conduct of 
government officials. 
This Article calls attention to that latent instability and, in so doing, begins 
to taxonomize and theorize the structure of constitutional norm change.  We 
explore some of the different modes in which unwritten norms break down (or 
  
13. Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United 
States, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1860.  Although capacious, this definition does not 
collapse constitutional norms into political norms, as the public behavior of high-level 
government officials is just one aspect of politics. 
14. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 9, at 921 (quoting David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 930 (2016)).  Constitutional norms as we define them may be a 
broader category than constitutional conventions, in that the latter are sometimes said to 
regulate dealings within and among government institutions, see, e.g., Jon Elster, 
Unwritten Constitutional Norms 21 (undated) (unpublished manuscript) 
[https://perma.cc/YPN8-764G], whereas the former are not necessarily limited to 
intragovernmental interactions.  For purposes of our analysis, nothing important hangs on 
the distinction (to the extent it exists) between constitutional norms and constitutional 
conventions. 
15. Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President Donald Trump, 
93 IND. L.J. 177, 190 (2018).  For an insightful account of the functional roles that informal 
norms play in the American political system, see Julia R. Azari & Jennifer K. Smith, 
Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in Established Democracies, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 37 
(2012). 
16. This observation is not necessarily limited to constitutional, or even explicitly political, 
norms.  Consider, for instance, the ways in which norms of polite conversation or 
appropriate attire change continually over time. 
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solidify) in our constitutional system and the different dangers and 
opportunities associated with each.  Moreover, we argue that under certain 
plausible conditions, it will be more worrisome when norms are subtly revised 
than when they are openly flouted.  This somewhat paradoxical argument 
suggests that many commentators have been misjudging our current 
moment: President Trump’s flagrant defiance of norms may not be as big a 
threat to our constitutional democracy as the more complex, and longer-
running, deterioration of norms underway in other political institutions. 
I. BREAKING DOWN NORM BREAKDOWN: DESTRUCTION, 
DECOMPOSITION, AND DISPLACEMENT 
The language of norms “breaking down” masks a great deal of complexity.  
As a first cut at refining our conversations on the subject, we can distinguish 
among three basic ways norms change over time: when they are destroyed, 
when they are decomposed, and when they are displaced. 
Norm destruction occurs when a norm is flouted or repudiated and, in 
consequence, ceases to exist, at least for a while.  A classic example from 
American history involves President Franklin Roosevelt’s disregard of the 
traditional prohibition, dating back to George Washington, against presidents 
serving more than two terms.17  By Roosevelt’s third and then fourth term in 
office, this highly salient constitutional norm appeared to have become a relic. 
Norm decomposition occurs when a norm is interpreted or applied in 
ways that are held out as compliant but that, over time, substantially alter or 
reduce whatever regulative force the norm previously possessed.  Daphna 
Renan, for instance, contends that within the executive branch, a commitment 
to “OLC supremacy”—according to which the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) authoritatively resolves legal questions through 
written opinions—has been overtaken in the past decade by a “porous” set of 
practices that rely much less on OLC and much more on informal, interagency 
working groups.18  No one ever made an explicit decision to jettison the old 
method of resolving legal questions.  Yet as a growing number of White House 
and agency actions progressively shrank the sphere in which OLC exercises 
  
17. See Whittington, supra note 13, at 1867–68 (“More than just an observed historical 
pattern, the departure of even popular presidents after a second term of office was taken to 
be normatively obligatory, central to the maintenance of the U.S. constitutional project.”). 
18. Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805, 815–48 (2017); see also id. 
at 809 (“While the myth of a supreme OLC dispensing formal legal opinions persists, the 
reality is a less insulated, more diffuse, and more informal set of institutional 
arrangements.”). 
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binding authority, the relatively strict norm of OLC supremacy transformed, 
on Renan’s account, into a relatively spongy norm of interagency 
deliberativeness. 
Norm destruction and norm decomposition are not strictly separate 
categories, but rather sit toward either end of a continuum of norm change.  In 
an ideal-typical case of norm destruction, the preexisting pattern of behavior is 
openly and flagrantly renounced and never again restored.  In an ideal-typical 
case of norm decomposition, the preexisting pattern of behavior is 
incrementally and imperceptibly tweaked until, at some point far down the line, 
the aggregation of all those tweaks yields a new normative pattern, one that 
informed observers would agree is a departure from the status quo ante.  Most 
cases of norm change fall well between these poles.  It is worth recalling in this 
regard that in the decades before President Roosevelt blew through the norm of 
the two-term presidency, the norm itself was becoming “increasingly murky” as 
new questions arose concerning nonconsecutive terms and partial terms of 
office.19  An extreme case of norm destruction was preceded by a much more 
ambiguous process of norm decomposition.  Moreover, as the next Part 
explains, there are multiple aspects of any given norm that may be contested at 
any given time and thus multiple dimensions to the destruction-
decomposition continuum.  We term these dimensions axes of instability.  
Although certain norms may be relatively stable over long stretches—and may 
even be internalized to the point that no one contemplates defying them20—the 
potential for endogenous change always exists and, for many norms at many 
junctures, is activated to some degree.  Norms are constantly being composed, 
decomposed, and recomposed in our constitutional system. 
Informal norms may also lose force not because they are destroyed or 
decomposed, but because they are displaced by law.  The norm of the two-term 
  
19. Whittington, supra note 13, at 1868.  Even after President Roosevelt successfully ran for a 
third term in 1940, some may have wondered whether the two-term norm was not “dead 
forever,” as his general election opponent insisted, see MICHAEL J. KORZI, PRESIDENTIAL 
TERM LIMITS IN AMERICAN HISTORY: POWER, PRINCIPLES, AND POLITICS 93 (2011) (quoting 
Wendell Willkie), but rather deemed “inapplicable in times of economic stress and with 
rumours of war abroad.”  Joseph Jaconelli, The Nature of Constitutional Convention, 19 
LEGAL STUD. 24, 33 (1999).  If this alternative understanding had taken hold, then 
Roosevelt would not have fully destroyed the norm so much as severely decomposed it by 
establishing a broad exception.  That is to say, if people from across the political spectrum 
tend to characterize Roosevelt’s third election as norm destructive, this is not because it is 
the only possible way to characterize the historical data, but because we have come to a 
relatively high degree of consensus about the nature and significance of Roosevelt’s 
behavior vis-à-vis the behaviors of prior presidents. 
20. See Pozen, supra note 10, at 69–70; Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1190–91. 
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presidency again supplies an example, as President Roosevelt’s breach of the 
norm led in short order to its codification in the Twenty-Second Amendment.21  
Additionally, institutions sometimes choose to displace their own norms.  In 
the early 1970s, at the height of the executive branch’s credibility gap and 
President Nixon’s conflicts with the press, DOJ issued guidelines clarifying 
and formalizing its practice of limiting the number of subpoenas issued to 
journalists.22  As these examples reflect, when norms are converted by judges, 
legislators, regulators, or constitutional amenders into legally binding 
directives, it is often in response to a perceived or feared breakdown.23 
 
Table 1.  Modes of Norm Change 
Mode Example 
Destruction Two-term presidency    Roosevelt’s third and fourth terms 
Decomposition OLC supremacy    porous legalism 
Displacement by law Prosecutorial restraint    DOJ media subpoena guidelines 
 
If it seems odd to think that constitutional norms are constantly evolving 
and devolving, the basic idea can be analogized to the well-known 
phenomenon of rules-standards convergence.  Legal rules are designed by their 
  
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1 (“No person shall be elected to the office of the President 
more than twice . . . .”). 
22. See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones 
Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 538 (2013) (discussing the 
development of DOJ’s media subpoena guidelines, now codified at 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 
(2017)).  This might be understood as an example of executive self-binding to stave off 
more stringent measures by other actors, such as legislatures or courts.  See id. at 539 n.142, 
573–77 (suggesting this interpretation); cf. Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered 
Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 
801, 895–96 (2011) (considering motivations for and types of “executive self-constraints”). 
23. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Third Bound, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1949, 1963 (2016) (“[T]he 
increasing breakdown of intragovernmental conventions of reciprocal cooperation 
between the parties . . . has brought about the explicit legalization and juridification of a 
number of executive-power questions that were previously within the domain of 
convention.”). 
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drafters to be clear and precise; legal standards are designed by their drafters to 
be open ended and context sensitive.  Yet in practice, as many scholars have 
noted, “these regulatory strategies gradually bleed into one another, as rules 
become riddled with qualifications and exceptions that reduce their clarity and 
standards become concretized through interpretations and understandings 
that reduce their flexibility.”24  So, too, can what were once crystalline informal 
norms (“Always consult OLC!”) decompose into muddier formulations 
(“Consult OLC when feasible” or “Seek advice from some legal office”), and 
vice versa.  The analogy is imperfect, though.  Because most legal directives are 
promulgated through a formal process and then subject to interpretation 
within an established judicial hierarchy, there is often a canonical statement of a 
directive at its origin and a subsequent body of written precedent that can be 
consulted to assess whether the directive has become more rule-like or 
standard-like. 
Informal norms, in contrast, generally arise as “the unplanned, 
unexpected result of . . . interactions,”25 and they may never be reduced to 
writing or brought before a body with acknowledged interpretive primacy.  It 
therefore can be quite difficult to pin down what a norm prescribes or 
proscribes, beyond some core set of behaviors and expectations, or to 
determine how its current contours map onto those of prior iterations.  
Constitutional norms plainly do become more or less constraining over time as 
new actors apply them in new circumstances; like Renan has done in her study 
of OLC,26 we can trace their decomposition and recomposition, as well as 
sometimes their destruction.  But as compared to judicially enforced 
constitutional commands, their informality may make it harder to assess when 
a breakdown has occurred and to what extent. 
II. BREAKING DOWN NORM BREAKDOWN: AXES OF INSTABILITY 
We have suggested that constitutional norms are dynamic in nature and 
that norm decomposition is a pervasive phenomenon.27  In more and less subtle 
  
24. Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of 
Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 1869 (2016).  See generally Carol M. Rose, Crystals 
and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988); Frederick Schauer, The 
Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303; Pierre Schlag, Rules and 
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985). 
25. Cristina Bicchieri & Ryan Muldoon, Social Norms, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-norms (last visited Aug. 30, 2018). 
26. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
27. Again, although this Article concerns constitutional norms, the basic point generalizes 
beyond the constitutional context.  For the suggestion that U.S. administrative law norms 
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ways, government officials are constantly reformulating, reinterpreting, and 
renegotiating their relationships with one another and with nongovernmental 
actors and institutions.  Outright norm destruction, on the other hand, appears 
to be a significantly rarer phenomenon.  As evidence of this, consider how 
frequently discussions of norm destruction in American constitutional politics 
turn to the same one example noted above: Roosevelt’s election to a third 
presidential term.28 
These two phenomena—the relative paucity of clear instances of norm 
destruction and the relative ubiquity of norm decomposition—are deeply 
related.  If constitutional norms are constantly in flux and if perceived breaches 
trigger disapproval, as well as other possible sanctions,29 rational politicians 
will generally seek to describe their own strategic behavior as consistent with 
prior practice.  By the same token, their opponents will seek to describe that 
behavior as unprecedented.  And because both sets of claims rest on “particular, 
contestable constructions of the past,”30 both may be plausible.  Unambiguous 
cases of constitutional norm destruction are so rare, then, not only because of 
the pressures on government officials to comply with norms and to be seen to 
comply, but also because all judgments about norm following and norm violating 
are subject to such interpretive contestation (again, usually in the absence of an 
authoritative adjudicator).  The best one can do in making the case for a 
“breakdown” is to try to offer a persuasive account of how contemporary 
patterns of behavior deviate from a larger historical pattern in which they are 
embedded.31 
But if we abstract from specific cases, we can also make some headway in 
elucidating the internal structure of norm breakdown.  In particular, we can 
identify several axes of instability for any given norm, concerning (1) what 
conduct the norm prescribes or proscribes, (2) to whom the norm applies, and 
  
have proven similarly dynamic in recent years, see Mila Sohoni, The Administrative 
Constitution in Exile, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 945 (2016) (discussing scholarship on 
the emergence of “novel and unorthodox administrative forms and structures”). 
28. See, e.g., STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 107–08, 138 (2018); 
Azari & Smith, supra note 15, at 44–45; Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Arrogance, 164 
U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1672 & n.124 (2016); Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 
80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1099–100 (2013); Siegel, supra note 15, at 181–82; Whittington, 
supra note 13, at 1867–69. 
29. See Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1182 (noting that constitutional norms “are enforced by 
the threat of political sanctions, such as defeat in reelection [or] retaliation by other 
political institutions and actors”). 
30. Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for a Usable 
Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96, 97 (2017). 
31. See id. at 130–32 (making a similar point with regard to claims of “unprecedentedness”). 
1440 65 UCLA L. REV. 1430 (2018) 
	
	
(3) when the norm is liable to be overridden.  These axes largely crosscut 
the destruction-decomposition continuum, such that it is possible for a 
norm to be destroyed or decomposed along each axis.  The axes themselves, 
moreover, are not fully distinct: They overlap with each other to some extent 
conceptually as well as in practice.  We believe that it is nevertheless useful to 
pull them apart, to give a fuller sense of the varieties of norm breakdown.32 
The first, and often the most salient, axis on which norms can break down 
involves their content, or the particular behaviors that are believed to be 
required or prohibited.  As British scholars have observed, “constitutional 
conventions . . . are beset with problems of defining their true content.”33  Some 
of these problems follow from the ineliminable potential for future vagueness 
and uncertainty that besets all norms.34  Ever since the failure of President 
Roosevelt’s 1937 plan to expand the Supreme Court by as many as six justices, 
for instance, many assume that there has been a constitutional norm against 
“court packing.”35  But what exactly does this disallow?  While close replicas of 
Roosevelt’s plan would pretty plainly violate any such norm, recent events 
suggest that it is less clear whether and how the norm applies to efforts to 
expand the size of lower federal courts.36  More generally, changes to a norm’s 
  
32. To be clear, in laying out these axes of instability, we do not claim to be illuminating the 
notoriously difficult question of why unwritten norms arise and then persist or 
change.  We hope to shed a little light, rather, on the more formalist question of how 
norms change.  Moreover, when we refer to specific norms in the discussion that follows, 
we are not doing the hard work of historical-political sociology that would be needed to 
argue persuasively that these norms existed and have broken down or are breaking down.  
We are simply positing that these norms have evolved in the manner described, as a means 
of illustrating the different dimensions on which norms can be destroyed or decomposed. 
33. Jaconelli, supra note 19, at 32. 
34. See generally Frederick Schauer, On the Open Texture of Law, 87 GRAZER PHILOSOPHISCHE 
STUDIEN 197 (2013). 
35. See Pozen, supra note 10, at 34, 38, 69; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical 
Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 
269–87 (2017) (reviewing the role that appeals to constitutional conventions played in the 
debate over Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan).  It bears note that even as to the premise that 
Roosevelt’s plan was a failure, significant interpretive contestation remains.  See, e.g., 
Chafetz, supra note 30, at 124–25. 
36. Compare Steven G. Calabresi & Shams Hirji, Judicial Appointments After Judge Robert H. 
Bork, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2017), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/11/judicial-
appointments-after-judge.html [https://perma.cc/B7HP-EM29] (defending a proposal to 
expand the size of the circuit and district courts as consistent with “past practice and 
norms of conventional behavior”), with Richard Primus, Rulebooks, Playgrounds, and 
Endgames: A Constitutional Analysis of the Calabresi-Hirji Judgeship Proposal, HARV. L. 
REV. BLOG (Nov. 24, 2017), http://blog.harvardlawreview.org/rulebooks-playgrounds-and-
endgames-a-constitutional-analysis-of-the-calabresi-hirji-judgeship-proposal 
[https://perma.cc/WN8F-3FTD] (“[I]t is . . . clear that the [Calabresi-Hirji] proposal 
threatens the permanent unraveling of a settlement that has made legitimate judicial 
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institutional or political context or to the incentives of relevant actors can, over 
time, change understandings—as well as reveal or create disagreements—as to 
what counts as compliance.  The filibuster furnishes an important example.  For 
most of Senate history, filibusters were employed sparingly and viewed as “the 
tool of last resort.”37  By the early twenty-first century, filibusters and threats of 
filibusters had become routine,38 even as senators from both parties continued 
to denounce their “excessive” use.39  The norm against ready recourse to the 
filibuster lingered on, yet as the tool became increasingly useful to increasingly 
organized minority parties,40 a long series of decisions by a long list of senators 
unsettled assumptions about how much filibustering was “too much” and 
watered down the norm to the point of near collapse. 
A second axis on which norms can break down involves their coverage, or 
the identities of the actors whose behavior is regulated.41  While certain 
constitutional norms—such as cooperation or coordination equilibria in 
bilateral repeated games42—will tend to apply to a relatively fixed set of actors, 
the identity of the individuals subject to other norms may be more fluid, with 
potentially significant practical and political implications.  Thus, a norm 
against “White House” interference with DOJ’s criminal investigations could 
become substantially less constraining depending on which officials are 
  
review possible for a century and a half.”).  As this controversy reflects, debates over the 
content of a norm will sometimes involve debates over the norm’s scope and how broadly 
or narrowly to construe precedents.  Constitutional scholars likewise recently debated 
whether Senate Republicans’ refusal to consider Judge Merrick Garland’s nomination to 
the Supreme Court violated a norm of providing timely advice and consent on such 
nominations (or any number of more precise permutations of that norm).  See Chafetz, 
supra note 30, at 106–09, 128–30 (reviewing this episode and the associated constitutional 
controversy). 
37. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 304 (9th ed. 2014). 
38. See id. at 304–05; Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 
1003, 1008–11 (2011). 
39. See, e.g., The Facts of Senate Dysfunction, SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM. (Dec. 11, 2012), 
http://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/the-facts-of-senate-dysfunction [https://perma.cc/ 
5CQA-4SVL] (disputing Senate Democrats’ claim that Republicans had made “excessive 
use of the filibuster in the 112th Congress” and arguing that the majority leader’s 
“unilateral and often unnecessary choice[s] to file cloture” were to blame). 
40. See generally GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN 
THE HOUSE AND SENATE 37–187 (2010). 
41. Note that this axis is not implicated by the current controversy over court packing.  People 
may debate whether and how the anti-court-packing norm applies to lower courts, see 
supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text, but no one has been debating whose behavior 
the norm regulates: the behavior of presidents and members of Congress.  In our 
terminology, the anti-court-packing norm has been experiencing instability as to its 
content and scope, but not as to its coverage. 
42. Cf. Elster, supra note 14, at 36–43 (analyzing certain constitutional conventions as 
coordination and cooperation equilibria); Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1186–89 (similar). 
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considered part of the White House for purposes of the norm.43  A more visible 
example of norm decomposition along this axis might be a declining sense that 
candidates for the presidency ought to be civil in their dealings with each 
other.44  Even if understandings of what constitutes civility or incivility do not 
change, and the content of the norm against incivility remains stable in that 
sense, these particular actors may no longer believe the norm to be relevant to 
their own interactions, or relevant to the same degree as before.  Still more 
dramatically, one could interpret various statements by President Trump 
suggesting that he sees himself as a world-historical figure whose greatness will 
brook no interference—that the standard rules of politics simply do not apply 
to him—as norm destructive along this axis.45 
A final axis on which norms can break down involves their override 
conditions and the willingness of actors to derogate from the norms’ ordinary 
strictures.  As Adrian Vermeule has suggested, under certain circumstances 
“even genuine conventions” may be defeasible—may be openly “qualified, 
overridden, or breached”—without necessarily being destroyed or eliciting a 
severe sanction.46  If changes in the institutional environment, the wider world, 
or the views of relevant segments of the public raise the expected cost of 
adherence to a norm, such circumstances may arise with greater frequency and 
thereby weaken the norm’s regulative force.  Over the course of his 
administration, for example, President Obama became increasingly willing to 
take measures that pushed the boundaries of executive power, on the theory 
that unprecedented obstructionism by congressional Republicans licensed or 
  
43. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 110-203, at 2–3 (2007) (describing a dramatic expansion under 
President George W. Bush of the number of officials potentially excluded from this norm).  On 
the norm generally, see Bruce Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the 
Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3126856; 
Andrew McCanse Wright, Justice Department Independence and White House Control 
(Feb. 18, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3125848. 
44. See, e.g., A Modest Suggestion, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.washington 
times.com/news/2016/mar/6/editorial-presidential-candidates-should-try-civil 
[https://perma.cc/8YWY-CPYD] (“Candidates for president . . . [now] speak in schoolyard 
expletives.  Newspapers, once the arbiters of public discourse, no longer flinch at printing 
the vilest blasphemy and cursing . . . .”). 
45. Put differently, a politician’s claim to be a Schmittian sovereign may amount to a claim 
that constitutional norms (as well as legally binding constitutional rules) do not apply to 
her.  See Noa Ben-Asher, Legalism and Decisionism in Crisis, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 699, 711–12 
(2010).  Some have interpreted Donald Trump’s boast upon accepting the Republican 
presidential nomination that “I alone can fix it” as such a claim.  Transcript: Donald Trump 
at the G.O.P. Convention, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/ 
22/us/politics/trump-transcript-rnc-address.html. 
46. Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1184. 
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even required him to exercise particular forms of “self-help.”47  The 
intransigence of these Republicans and the frustrations of Democratic voters 
and legislators made it politically rational, from Obama’s perspective, to 
reconsider a range of constitutional norms that were inhibiting government 
action as part of his “We Can’t Wait” campaign.48  Across both the Democratic 
and Republican coalitions, more broadly, the waning influence of traditional 
party insiders may be putting pressure on elected officials to rethink their 
compliance with norms of interparty and interbranch restraint in a growing 
number of situations.49 
 
Table 2.  Axes of Norm Instability 
Axis Decomposition  Involves . . .  Example 
What conduct does the 
norm prescribe or 
proscribe? 
A growing set of arguably 
irregular behaviors are 
claimed to be compliant. 
Norm against 
“excessive” use of 
Senate filibusters 
To whom does the 
norm apply? 
A growing set of actors 
are claimed not to be 
subject to the norm. 
Norm against “White 
House” interference 
with DOJ 
When is the norm liable 
to be overridden? 
A growing set of 
circumstances are 
claimed to justify 
qualifying or breaching 
the norm. 
Norms against 
executive unilateralism 
during President 
Obama’s “We Can’t 
Wait” campaign 
 
Each of these axes of instability has an analogue in the context of legally 
binding directives, but the discrepancies between law and norms mean that 
they work in somewhat different ways.  This difference is likely smallest 
along the axis of changed content.  As already mentioned,50 the literature on 
rules-standards convergence has shown how interpreters and enforcers 
routinely change the effective meaning of legal directives even in the absence of 
a formal amendment, so that, for example, a rule that says “Speed limit 55” 
  
47. See Pozen, supra note 10, at 4–8, 41–47. 
48. Id. 
49. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 9, at 944–51. 
50. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
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comes over time to mean something more like “Do not drive recklessly and in 
any case don’t exceed 70.” 
Legal instability based on shifting understandings of whom a law regulates 
is less common but not altogether unfamiliar.  Consider in this vein recent 
debates over whether the federal antinepotism statute applies to positions in the 
White House51 and whether the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause applies 
to the president or only to officers serving under the president.52  Or consider 
the recent extension to same-sex couples of the constitutional right to marry.53  
Both the generality that is characteristic of promulgated law and the possibility 
of an authoritative interpretation of a law’s reach by a body such as the Supreme 
Court or OLC, however, limit legal instability on this axis at any point in time. 
Breakdowns based on shifting understandings of a law’s override conditions 
are still less familiar, at least in the constitutional context.  For it is a fundamental 
feature of contemporary American constitutionalism—and itself a constitutional 
norm—that “government officeholders and aspirants cannot, if they wish to 
remain politically viable, . . . admit to violating the Constitution, or even to having 
doubts about the wisdom of following the Constitution.”54  Although officials 
may well take liberties in construing any given constitutional provision, they 
virtually never suggest (explicitly, at least55) that the Constitution’s commands 
should be qualified, set aside, or breached in light of practical exigencies or 
changed circumstances.56 
  
51. See Melina Delkic & Alex Mallin, Nepotism Laws Don’t Apply to Jared Kushner 
Appointment, DOJ Says, ABC NEWS (Jan. 21, 2017, 4:14 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Politics/nepotism-laws-apply-jared-kushner-appointment-doj/story?id=44951811 
[https://perma.cc/2MQK-ATSQ]. 
52. See Seth Barrett Tillman & Steven G. Calabresi, Debate, The Great Divorce: The Current 
Understanding of Separation of Powers and the Original Meaning of the Incompatibility 
Clause, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 134 (2008). 
53. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
54. David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 941 (2016); see also 
Pozen, supra note 10, at 66–67 (explaining that while U.S. government officials sometimes 
respond to perceived norm violations by other officials with norm violations of their own, 
it is never considered legitimate to respond with violations of legally binding constitutional 
constraints). 
55. Cf. Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret History of American Constitutional Skepticism: A 
Recovery and Preliminary Evaluation, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 85–86 (2014) (arguing that 
while the “skeptical tradition” in American constitutionalism may appear to have died out 
in the modern period, it persists “beneath the surface”). 
56. As Robert Cover famously chronicled, even abolitionist judges in the antebellum period 
felt constrained to issue proslavery rulings on account of their situatedness in the legal 
system writ large.  See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).  
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Thinking in terms of axes of instability, then, not only allows us to begin to 
taxonomize norm breakdown; it also allows us to clarify a number of 
similarities and dissimilarities between legal change and norm change.  And 
with this finer-grained picture of the latter phenomenon in view, we might 
begin to refine our judgments about specific cases.  In particular, we might gain 
some purchase on the question of what sorts of norm breakdowns ought to 
worry us most, and under what circumstances. 
III. SOME NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF NORM INSTABILITY 
Our most basic evaluative claim is that it is difficult to make strong 
normative claims about norm stability or instability in the abstract.  After all, 
the mere fact that members of a community conform to certain behavioral 
regularities and disapprove of nonconformity does not make those 
behavioral regularities good.  At points in American history, perhaps including 
the present, constitutional norms have helped entrench everything from white 
supremacism to patriarchal gender relations to the marginalization of the 
poor.57  Moreover, the observation that many of today’s constitutional norms 
are very different from those that obtained at earlier points in American 
history58 should caution against a too-easy assumption that prevailing practices 
are desirable or that their breakdown would necessarily be regrettable.59  
  
57. For instance, to the extent that there is a constitutional or political norm against 
officeholders’ labeling racism as such except in the most extreme circumstances, it will 
tend to legitimize and reinforce various forms of racism, especially structural racism.  
Consider in this regard the condemnation that President Obama faced in 2009, eventually 
leading to White House backpedaling, when he implied that police racism was to blame for 
the arrest of Henry Louis Gates Jr. outside Gates’s own home.  See Christina Bellantoni, 
Gates Remark Steals Focus for Obama—Police Unions Voice Anger, WASH. TIMES, July 24, 
2009, at A1.  For this reason, white supremacists have made assiduous efforts to maintain 
this norm.  See Gene Demby, Is It Racist to Call Someone ‘Racist’?, NPR: CODE SWITCH 
(Nov. 23, 2016, 6:47 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2016/11/23/ 
503180254/is-it-racist-to-call-someone-racist; see also Aziz Huq, Conventions as a 
Consequence of the Incomplete Nature of Constitutional Bargains 4–5 (2018) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (suggesting that certain constitutional 
conventions, including the House of Representatives’s pre–Civil War “gag rule” forbidding 
the consideration of antislavery petitions, have entrenched “rotten compromises”); Corey 
Robin, Democracy Is Norm Erosion, COREY ROBIN BLOG (Jan. 28, 2018), 
http://coreyrobin.com/2018/01/28/democracy-is-norm-erosion [https://perma.cc/F8LB-
2RLH] (describing abolitionist and Reconstructionist politics from the 1850s through the 
1870s as “a politics of norm-shattering”). 
58. See, e.g., Azari & Smith, supra note 15, at 48 (describing the radical shift in the public role 
of the presidency over the past century). 
59. Cf. JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 6 (2017) (“[I]lluminating both the fact of change across time and 
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Whatever one’s moral priors or views on government, one is likely to find fault 
with at least some of the constitutional norms in effect at any given moment.60  
Democracy, in the words of political theorist Corey Robin, is among other 
things “a permanent project of norm erosion”61—and, we would add, norm 
reconstruction. 
Even so, one might believe that there are important general advantages to 
norm stability.  Norm stability could be defended, for instance, on Burkean 
grounds.  In Anthony Kronman’s telling, Burke subscribed to “the 
ancient . . . idea that the past has an authority of its own which, however 
circumscribed, is inherent and direct rather than derivative.”62  The mere 
existence of a norm, on this view, provides a presumptive reason to preserve it.  
Sounding a Burkean note, leading theorists of constitutional conventions have 
suggested that deviating from them amounts to “a breach of ‘constitutional 
morality’”63 or a failure of “institutional citizenship.”64  Related to the Burkean 
rationale might be an Oakeshottian one, or the idea that the rejection of 
prevailing rules in favor of something “better” represents a form of epistemic 
hubris, one that mistakenly applies abstract reasoning when practical reasoning 
is called for and thereby threatens to bring on a much worse state of political 
  
the agency and contingency that have factored into that change . . . is a useful corrective to 
accounts of politics that treat extant institutional arrangements as inevitable.  Contingency 
creates room for effective critique . . . .”). 
60. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
991, 1033 (2008) (explaining that “there is no reason to expect that interaction between 
national lawmaking institutions will tend to produce anything like efficient,” or social 
welfare-maximizing, “customs or norms”); Pozen, supra note 10, at 80–81 (“Longstanding 
interbranch norms . . . may be workable and attractive to a Burkean traditionalist, yet 
suboptimal from any number of perspectives.  On some readings of the Constitution, they 
may even be unlawful.” (footnote omitted)). 
61. Robin, supra note 57. 
62. Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047 (1990).  Kronman 
describes this idea as “now largely discredited.”  Id.  But see Gerald J. Postema, On the 
Moral Presence of Our Past, 36 MCGILL L.J. 1153, 1156, 1160 (1991) (arguing that “[i]n law, 
as in much of the rest of our lives, the past is present in our moral or practical deliberations 
in the form of precedent” and that “[t]he moral force of precedent must be, at least to some 
degree, independent of the merits of the decision”). 
63. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 35, at 266 (quoting A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 346 (London, MacMillan & Co. 3d ed. 1889)).  This 
suggestion is especially plausible when the convention violator has benefited from others’ 
adherence to the convention in the past; such cases may implicate not only considerations 
of institutional continuity and functioning but also the internal morality of promise 
keeping, even if the promise is only implicit.  From an external perspective, however, if the 
bargain reflected in a constitutional convention seems likely to generate bad policy or like a 
cartel deal, it is unclear why anyone who is not party to the bargain would be morally 
committed to its maintenance. 
64. Siegel, supra note 15, at 189. 
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affairs.65  One might accordingly assume that, all else equal, more norm 
instability is clearly worse than less norm instability and that norm destruction 
is clearly worse than norm decomposition.  Norm destruction can upend 
settled behavioral patterns quickly and dramatically, as in the case of President 
Roosevelt’s third term.  Norm decomposition occurs relatively quietly and 
incrementally—indeed, those who are reinterpreting the norm will tend to 
deny that any change is occurring—and thus the damage to constitutional 
expectations and small-c conservative values may be relatively modest. 
This is not wholly off base.  We do not dismiss the content-independent 
rationales for norm stability, nor do we deny that there are good reasons to be 
concerned about norm destruction.  Such concerns may be especially acute 
when it appears that a norm is being undermined out of narrow personal or 
partisan self-interest.  But the dynamic character of constitutional norms does 
provide some reason to be skeptical of theories that would valorize 
constitutional norm continuity as such.  Given, for example, the way in which 
norms about acceptable levels of legislative obstruction by the minority party 
have fluctuated throughout American history,66 it is not clear why a maneuver 
that departs from the immediately preceding period’s patterns of obstruction 
should cause alarm on that basis alone. 
In addition, and somewhat paradoxically, if one is enamored of a 
constitutional norm in its current form—or, at least, if one thinks that it is 
superior to the likely alternatives—then spectacular efforts to destroy that norm 
may be less troubling than subtler efforts to decompose it.  The basic reason is 
  
65. See MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 5 (Liberty Fund rev. ed. 1991).  Other rationales have been put forward for the 
desirability of norm stability, including the fostering of intragovernmental cooperation 
and coordination, the promotion of accountability and efficiency, and the avoidance of tit-
for-tat retaliatory cycles.  See, e.g., GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: 
THE RULES AND FORMS OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (1984) (cooperation); id. at 18, 210 
(accountability); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative 
Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (1997) (efficiency).  
These virtues are not features of norms qua norms, however, but rather features of 
particular norms.  For instance, it is entirely possible to have norms against cooperation 
and coordination.  Norms that enable certain forms of agency independence, notably, 
disable corresponding forms of collaboration with other arms of the state.  See generally 
Vermeule, supra note 11, at 1194–214.  Likewise, the efficiency of norms depends on their 
content and context.  See generally, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, 
Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
2027 (2001) (describing scenarios in which decentralized processes are unlikely to produce 
efficient norms).  To make a case for the inherent social value of norm stability, and 
therefore for the inherent undesirability of norm erosion, one must point to virtues that 
are not contingent in this way. 
66. See CHAFETZ, supra note 59, at 280–90, 296–301; Chafetz, supra note 30, at 111–19. 
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that behaviors seen as flouting a constitutional norm will almost invariably 
have greater salience, both among political elites and the public at large, than 
incremental revisions or refinements.  This salience differential means that a 
norm flouter is highly likely to face questions from, and to have to offer 
justifications to, her political opponents.  Such critical dialogue is less likely to 
be sparked by norm decompositions, which, as discussed above, are generally 
asserted to be norm compliance.  Insofar as vigorous public debate improves 
decisionmaking, apparent attempts to destroy a constitutional norm may 
produce better or more democratic outcomes than attempts to modify its 
content or coverage.67 
Related to, and enabled by, the greater salience associated with norm 
flouting is the greater likelihood of backlash.  This backlash could take any 
number of forms, from media outcry to protests in the streets to the use of 
institutional leverage by other government actors (including by displacing the 
imperiled norm with a binding legal directive); and it could be sited in any 
number of institutions, from civil society groups to the courts to the legislature.  
The typically greater transparency and simplicity of norm destruction are thus 
valuable not only in themselves, from the perspective of public comprehension 
and deliberation, but also instrumentally for triggering sanctions.  Publicity-
dependent enforcement mechanisms are unlikely to work as well in cases of 
decomposition. 
For a simple set of reasons, then, norm-decomposing maneuvers may in 
many instances be more worrisome than norm-flouting maneuvers.  Only the 
latter reliably generate their own correctives.68  We believe this argument has 
  
67. This is loosely analogous to David Dyzenhaus’s argument that legal grey holes—situations 
in which “there are some legal constraints on executive action . . . but the constraints are so 
insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it pleases”—can be even 
worse than the “lawless void” of black holes.  DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 42 (2006).  For Dyzenhaus, this is because the 
creation of law-free zones may force government actors to state a politically unacceptable 
truth, while grey holes allow them to “have [their] cake and eat it too” by achieving the 
same functional result without being held accountable for it.  Id.; see also David Dyzenhaus, 
Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2005, 2025–26 (2006).  Likewise, norm decomposition may have the same endpoint as 
norm destruction, but without drawing nearly as much scrutiny or debate. 
68. In a recent essay, Vermeule draws a sharp distinction between what he calls 
extragovernmental and intragovernmental conventions.  “Some conventions are indeed 
enforced by the threat of moralized outrage on the part of the diffuse mass of public 
opinion,” he writes; “let us call those extragovernmental conventions.”  Vermeule, supra 
note 23, at 1956.  “Other conventions are enforced by the credible threat of retaliation from 
the other political party, another branch of the government, or some other institutional 
actor, even as to issues about which the general public is largely oblivious. . . .  We might 
call those intragovernmental conventions.”  Id. (footnote omitted). Yet conventions are 
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important implications for American constitutional practice generally and the 
Trump administration specifically.  Before turning to Trump, however, we 
hasten to note several crucial complications.  First, the argument itself 
generates something of an endogeneity problem.  If attempted norm 
destruction is not as worrisome as attempted norm decomposition because of 
the distinctive pushback it generates, it may become worse precisely to the 
extent that civil society actors internalize this point and refocus their energies away 
from combatting attempted destructions and toward combatting decompositions.  
Moreover, because there is no bright line separating destruction from 
decomposition, political struggles over allegedly counternormative behaviors 
not only will be shaped by perceptions of whether those behaviors amount to 
destruction or decomposition, but also may shape those very perceptions. 
Second, norm flouting and norm decomposition need not be mutually 
exclusive.  If the flouting of one set of norms by one actor leads that same actor 
or her political allies to engage in more opportunistic behavior with respect to 
other norms—if it complements rather than substitutes for decomposition—
there may be cause for greater, rather than lesser, concern.  On the other hand, 
insofar as norm flouting generates broad critique and backlash, norm 
decomposition that is coupled with norm flouting may actually be less 
successful than norm decomposition on its own, depending on partisan and 
ideological alignments. 
Third, flouting can succeed.  If desirable norms are flouted frequently 
enough with enough success, we have a significant problem no matter how 
transparent the flouting or how vigorous the backlash.  And one might wonder 
whether various attributes of today’s political and informational environment, 
such as high levels of partisan polarization or the rise of media “filter bubbles,” 
have decreased the odds that the flouting of desirable constitutional norms will 
be effectively repulsed. 
As this last complication implies, the argument that constitutional norm 
decomposition is more worrisome than constitutional norm flouting will hold 
only under certain sociopolitical conditions.  Specifying these conditions in any 
detail would be an enormously challenging, multidisciplinary task.  But at a 
minimum, the argument presupposes that democratic institutions are in 
reasonably good working order, with basically functioning electoral systems, a 
strong press and civil society, and dispersion of power across government 
  
not necessarily one or the other.  Virtually any constitutional convention has the potential 
to take on an “extragovernmental” dimension if a high-level official sets out to destroy it, as 
in our political culture such efforts are apt to arouse public opinion. 
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bodies.  If these baseline conditions fail, the mechanisms of deliberation and 
disputation are far less likely to materialize and far less likely to have any impact 
if they do. 
As the next Part explains, the experience of the first year and a half of the 
Trump administration suggests that these baseline conditions continue to 
obtain in the United States.  This is consistent with Aziz Huq and Tom 
Ginsburg’s conclusion that the United States has relatively strong legal and 
institutional safeguards against what they call “authoritarian reversion,” 
involving “a wholesale, rapid collapse into authoritarianism.”69  Instead, Huq 
and Ginsburg contend, the more plausible danger in the United States is 
“constitutional retrogression,” involving an incremental “decay in [the] basic 
predicates of democracy,” such as “autonomous bureaucratic capacity” and a 
“shared epistemic foundation.”70  The irony here is that if explicit efforts to 
destroy constitutional norms in America today are less dangerous than many 
assume, seeing them as a fundamental threat to the republic is apt to distract us 
from other risks and thereby make efforts to decompose constitutional norms 
even more dangerous. 
IV. REASSESSING THREATS TO CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 
IN THE AGE OF TRUMP 
Let us now bring the analysis fully up to the present: What does our 
account of norm breakdown suggest about constitutional norms in the age of 
Trump? 
Descriptively, President Trump’s critics are not wrong to insist that he has 
flouted a large number of norms.71  Yet given our skepticism about strong 
versions of theories that venerate constitutional norm stability as such,72 we 
believe that the more important criticisms look to the substance of his 
transgressions.  In other words, if Trump’s defiance of constitutional norms 
is unusually disturbing, it is not so much because these norms are norms as 
because they are beneficial.73 
  
69. Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78, 
83, 100–17 (2018). 
70. Id. at 83, 117–62.  
71. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
72. See supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text. 
73. In a similar spirit, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have emphasized that while President 
Trump “was a serial norm breaker” during his first year in office, where he “really stands 
out from his predecessors is in his willingness to challenge . . . norms that are essential to 
the health of democracy.”  LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 28, at 195. 
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Without delving too deeply into political or moral theory, we think we can 
safely say that it is bad for a president or presidential candidate to: lie 
constantly,74 deny the validity of fairly administered elections,75 threaten to jail 
political opponents,76 maintain business interests while in public office in a 
manner that invites foreign governments and political allies to funnel money 
toward those interests,77 make racist remarks and wink at white supremacists,78 
strive to delegitimize the press,79 invite a foreign government to interfere in 
American electoral processes,80 appoint unqualified friends and family 
members to important government positions,81 and so on.  Individually, these 
  
74. For a running tally of President Trump’s lies in office, see Daniel Dale, Donald Trump Has 
Said ____ False Things as U.S. President, TORONTO STAR, http://projects.thestar.com/donald-
trump-fact-check/index.html (last updated Aug. 29, 2018) [https://perma.cc/K68Z-QEZH] 
(counting 2436 false statements by President Trump at the time of this Article’s 
publication). 
75. See, e.g., Chas Danner, Donald Trump Falsely Blames Popular-Vote Loss on Voter Fraud, 
N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 27, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/11/donald-trump-
blames-popular-vote-loss-on-voter-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/V2YK-Q9AV]; Richard 
L. Hasen, Trump’s Voting Investigation Is a Great Idea, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/01/trump_s_voting
_fraud_investigation_is_a_great_idea.html [https://perma.cc/QVL6-STSG]. 
76. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Threat to Jail Clinton Smacks of ‘Tin-Pot Dictators,’ Experts Say, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/11/us/politics/donald-
trump-hillary-clinton-special-prosecutor.html. 
77. See, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold & Jonathan O’Connell, Nine Questions About President 
Trump’s Businesses and Possible Conflicts of Interest, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2018), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/nine-questions-about-president-trumps-
businesses-and-possible-conflicts-of-interest/2018/01/29/f8b2a3a8-014f-11e8-9d31-
d72cf78dbeee_story.html [https://perma.cc/Z37V-ZE3E].  
78. See, e.g., Dylan Scott, “Shithole” Countries, Donald Trump’s Latest Racist Tirade, Explained, 
VOX (Jan. 12, 2018, 11:40 AM), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/12/ 
16882840/donald-trump-shithole-daca [https://perma.cc/H3VR-4UPL]; Glenn Thrush & 
Maggie Haberman, Trump Gives White Supremacists an Unequivocal Boost, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 15, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-charlottesville-
white-nationalists.html. 
79. See, e.g., Steve Coll, Donald Trump’s “Fake News” Tactics, NEW YORKER (Dec. 11, 2017), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/11/donald-trumps-fake-news-tactics 
[https://perma.cc/2U7U-Z6RF]. 
80. See, e.g., Ashley Parker & David E. Sanger, Donald Trump Calls on Russia to Find Hillary 
Clinton’s Missing Emails, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
07/28/us/politics/donald-trump-russia-clinton-emails.html. 
81. See, e.g., Peter Baker et al., Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump: Pillars of Family-Driven West 
Wing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/us/politics/ jared-
kushner-ivanka-trump-white-house.html; David Faris, Trump’s White House Is a 
Hurricane of Dysfunction and Incompetence, WEEK (July 31, 2017), http://the 
week.com/articles/715385/trumps-white-house-hurricane-dysfunction-incompetence 
[https://perma.cc/YV8P-REC6]; Paul Waldman, Donald Trump Has Assembled the Worst 
Cabinet in American History, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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violations of unwritten rules are dismaying.  Combined, they amount to a 
wholesale assault on the ideal of a constitutionally restrained and responsible 
executive.  President Trump, we might say, is a constitutional norm flouter 
par excellence. 
At the same time, and as our analysis in the preceding Part would predict, 
Trump’s presidency has been marked by impassioned resistance to his norm 
flouting.  By a variety of metrics, many civil society organizations are stronger 
than they have been in quite some time, in a manner attributable to—and 
facilitative of—pushback against President Trump.  Daniel Dale, the reporter 
who has most assiduously tracked Trump’s lies,82 is emphatic that the lies 
“haven’t worked,” given, among other things, polling data that suggest 
Americans overwhelmingly view Trump as untrustworthy and have become 
more accepting, not less, of Muslims and other groups he has denigrated.83  
Public interest journalism has flourished in the face of Trump’s attacks, as 
subscriptions and donations to media outlets ranging from the New York Times 
to the Wall Street Journal to Mother Jones to ProPublica have spiked since his 
election,84 and the Washington Post’s David Fahrenthold won a Pulitzer Prize 
(and a cult following) for his reporting on Trump’s misrepresentations of his 
charitable giving.85  Donations to groups ranging from the American Civil 
Liberties Union to the Southern Poverty Law Center to Planned Parenthood to 
  
blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/01/19/donald-trump-has-assembled-the-worst-cabinet-in-
american-history [https://perma.cc/S35X-BZAY]. 
82. See supra note 74. 
83. Daniel Dale, Donald Trump Has Spent a Year Lying Shamelessly. It Hasn’t Worked, 
TORONTO STAR (Dec. 22, 2017), http://www.thestar.com/news/world/analysis/2017/ 
12/22/donald-trump-has-spent-a-year-lying-shamelessly-it-hasnt-worked.html 
[https://perma.cc/FHQ4-XWNU]. 
84. See, e.g., Matthew J. Belvedere & Michael Newberg, New York Times Subscription Growth 
Soars Tenfold, Adding 132,000, After Trump’s Win, CNBC (Nov. 29, 2016, 10:32 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/29/new-york-times-subscriptions-soar-tenfold-after-
donald-trump-wins-presidency.html [https://perma.cc/3Q77-724G]; Jackie Flynn 
Mogensen, 10 Great Things That Trump Has Given America in the Last Year, MOTHER 
JONES (Nov. 8, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/11/ten-great-
things-that-trump-has-given-america-in-the-last-year [https://perma.cc/X2AV-W2MZ]. 
85. See Paul Farhi, Washington Post’s David Fahrenthold Wins Pulitzer Prize for Dogged 
Reporting of Trump’s Philanthropy, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.washington 
post.com/lifestyle/style/washington-posts-david-fahrenthold-wins-pulitzer-prize-for-
dogged-reporting-of-trumps-philanthropy/2017/04/10/dd535d2e-1dfb-11e7-be2a-
3a1fb24d4671_story.html [https://perma.cc/6S73-5EN5].  The 2018 Pulitzers continued in 
this vein, awarding prizes for skeptical coverage of President Trump’s proposed border 
wall and for coverage of Russian interference in the 2016 election and in the Trump 
administration.  See 2018 Pulitzer Prize Winners: Full List, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2018), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/16/business/media/pulitzer-prize-winners.html. 
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the Environmental Defense Fund have likewise swelled during Trump’s 
presidency.86 
Government institutions have also pushed back against President Trump 
in ways that respond directly and indirectly to his norm violations.  Pointing at 
times to Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric as well as various procedural 
irregularities, federal courts have struck down, stayed, or forced significant 
modifications to his administration’s immigration policies regarding travel 
bans,87 sanctuary cities,88 and the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
program,89 leading some to conclude that judges are part of a “legal resistance” 
against Trump.90  Despite the fact that Republicans control both the House and 
the Senate and are continually charged by Democrats with partisan 
obsequiousness to the president, Congress has been an additional (if uneven) 
site of resistance.  This has taken forms ranging from new economic sanctions 
on Russia passed by nearly unanimous majorities in both chambers as 
  
86. See According to Charity Navigator, First 100 Days of Trump Administration Changed a 
Pattern in Charitable Donations, CHARITY NAVIGATOR (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.charity 
navigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpid=4890 [https://perma.cc/A4N2-P56L]. 
87. The Supreme Court, by a 5–4 vote, ultimately upheld the third iteration of the 
administration’s travel ban in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).  However, lower 
court decisions enjoining the ban not only had the effect of delaying its implementation, 
but also resulted in a significant narrowing of the original version.  See Steve Vladeck, The 
Supreme Court’s Muslim Travel Ban Case Proves the Power of the Judiciary Branch in the 
Age of Trump, NBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2018, 2:27 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/ 
think/opinion/muslim-travel-ban-supreme-court-case-proves-power-judiciary-branch-
ncna868736 [https://perma.cc/KV79-VERX] (noting, prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision, that “whether the justices ultimately side with the president or the challengers in 
Trump v. Hawaii, the . . . federal courts . . . have been instrumental in pushing the executive 
branch to more properly tailor what Trump calls the ‘travel ban’ in the first place”). 
88. County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017); City of Chicago v. 
Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017), aff’d 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018). 
89. Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
90. This terminology has been used by conservative critics and liberal supporters alike.  On the 
conservative side, see, for example, Josh Blackman, On the Judicial Resistance, LAWFARE 
(Feb. 12, 2018), http://lawfareblog.com/judicial-resistance [https://perma.cc/B73C-
3NWW]; Judging the Travel Ban—and Judges, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2018, at A12.  On the 
liberal side, see, for example, Eric Schneiderman, A Year of Legal Resistance, MEDIUM (Dec. 
26, 2017), http://medium.com/@AGSchneiderman/over-100-official-acts-to-protect-new-
yorkers-from-washingtons-harmful-agenda-cf046c5dbd07 [https://perma.cc/H8AP-R3GG]; 
Jeff Turrentine, This Leader of the (Legal) Resistance Has Never Felt More Ready, NRDC 
(Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.nrdc.org/stories/leader-legal-resistance-never-felt-more-ready 
[https://perma.cc/8TED-QMXV].  Others on the left, however, urge that this 
characterization of the judiciary be rejected.  See Dahlia Lithwick & Steve Vladeck, 
Resisting the Myth of the Judicial Resistance, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2018, 4:44 PM), 
http://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/01/the-judges-whove-ruled-against-trump-
arent-part-of-some-judicial-resistance.html [https://perma.cc/3TNQ-6DT5]. 
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punishment for Russia’s pro-Trump electoral meddling,91 to resolutions that 
convey disagreement with the president’s foreign policy provocations,92 to 
oversight hearings that have damaged his public standing,93 to refusals to confirm 
some of his preferred personnel.94  Nor is the governmental resistance limited 
to federal institutions.  For instance, state officials have brought some of the 
leading lawsuits against the administration; several state legislatures are 
considering more aggressive measures, such as requiring presidential 
candidates to disclose their tax returns as a condition of ballot access;95 and at 
  
91. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44, 131 Stat. 
886 (2017). 
92. E.g., H.R. Res. 256, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted) (expressing support for the NATO 
alliance in the face of Trump’s attacks); H.R. Res. 397, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted) 
(same); S. Res. 584, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted) (expressing opposition to allowing 
Russia to question former U.S. diplomatic and military personnel, a proposal to which 
Trump had signaled openness).  On the importance of such resolutions, see generally 
Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons From Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 573 (2008). 
93. See Josh Chafetz, The Real ‘Resistance’ to Trump? The GOP Congress., POLITICO (June 6, 
2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/06/the-real-resistance-to-trump-
the-gop-congress-215230 [https://perma.cc/7KF3-3G3R]. 
94. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, 4 Trump Nominees Have Gone Down in One Week, and He’s Got 
GOP Senators to Blame, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2017), http://www.washington 
post.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/12/19/four-trump-nominees-have-gone-down-in-one-
week-and-hes-got-gop-senators-to-blame [https://perma.cc/4BF3-VBLP]; Karoun 
Demirjian, White House Withdraws Judicial Nominee Ryan Bounds, After GOP Realizes He 
Didn’t Have Votes for Confirmation, WASH. POST (July 19, 2018), http://www.washington 
post.com/powerpost/senate-gop-withdraws-judicial-nominee-ryan-bounds-delivering-a-
blow-to-trumps-court-plans/2018/07/19/0d81ff50-8b83-11e8-8aea-86e88ae760d8_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/USP3-LQHZ]; Alan Rappeport, Labor Choice Drops Out After 
Republicans Balk, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2017, at A1.  See generally Anne Joseph O’Connell, 
After One Year in Office, Trump’s Behind on Staffing but Making Steady Progress, 
BROOKINGS (Jan. 23, 2018), http://www.brookings.edu/research/after-one-year-in-office-
trumps-behind-on-staffing-but-making-steady-progress [https://perma.cc/MZ69-VHCM] 
(“In the first year, President Trump had a higher [nominee] failure rate . . . than all but one 
of his predecessors [going back through the George H.W. Bush administration].”). 
95. The California State Legislature actually passed such a bill, only to have it vetoed by 
Democratic Governor Jerry Brown over constitutional concerns.  See John Myers, Trump 
Won’t Have to Disclose Tax Returns to Get on California’s Ballot, as Gov. Jerry Brown 
Vetoes Bill, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2017, 11:54 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/ 
essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-trump-tax-returns-veto-jerry-brown-
1508092026-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/7PEU-SCAZ].  On the debate over the 
constitutionality of such laws, see, for example, Richard L. Hasen, How States Could Force 
Trump to Release His Tax Returns, POLITICO (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.politico.com/ 
magazine/story/2017/03/donald-trump-tax-returns-release-214950 [https://perma.cc/ 
5JNZ-YSRC]; Derek T. Muller, Don’t Use the Ballot to Get Trump’s Tax Returns, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/opinion/dont-use-the-ballot-
to-get-trumps-tax-returns.html. 
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least one state is conducting its own investigation into Trump’s business 
dealings.96 
Voters, too, have gotten in on the act.  If some of President Trump’s 
supporters thrill to his norm transgressions, elections since November 2016, 
both special and regular, have demonstrated widespread discontent with 
Trump and his party.97  Relatedly, Republican members of Congress (including 
the Speaker of the House) are retiring in droves,98 while Democrats are 
experiencing a banner recruiting season,99 spurred in part by new groups like 
Run for Something.100 
Largely as a consequence of these interrelated developments, Trump is by 
many measures “a weak president,” if not “on the brink of a failed 
  
96. See Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum, New York Attorney General Seeks Power to 
Bypass Presidential Pardons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
04/18/nyregion/schneiderman-trump-mueller-pardons.html; Colby Hamilton, After 
Shake-up, NY AG’s Office Remains Backstop for Trump-Related Probes, N.Y.L.J. (May 24, 
2018), http://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/05/24/after-shake-up-ny-ags-office-
remains-backstop-for-trump-related-probes [https://perma.cc/Y6AH-NDY2]. 
97. On special elections, see Philip Bump, This Is What the Democratic Special Election Wave 
Looks Like, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
politics/wp/2018/01/17/this-is-what-the-democratic-special-election-wave-looks-like 
[https://perma.cc/6JKX-KT5U]; Harry Enten, Special Elections So Far Point to a 
Democratic Wave in 2018, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 13, 2017), http://fivethirtyeight.com/ 
features/special-elections-so-far-point-to-a-democratic-wave-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/ 
Z8AD-XZU3]; G. Elliott Morris, What Happened in Pennsylvania’s 18th and What It 
Means for Democrats in November, CROSSTAB (Mar. 16, 2018), http://www.the 
crosstab.com/2018/03/16/pa-18 [https://perma.cc/6XEV-SNG2]; Matthew Yglesias, 
Democrats Flipped a Missouri State Legislature Seat That Trump Won by 28 Points, VOX 
(Feb. 7, 2018, 10:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/ 2018/2/7/16984836/ 
missouri-special-election-results [https://perma.cc/4BSB-V3JM].  On regular elections, see 
Eric Bradner, Democrats Sweep in Virginia, New Jersey, CNN (Nov. 8, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/07/politics/2017-us-election-highlights/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/44VY-8LPS]. 
98. See Russell Berman, The 2018 Congressional Retirement Tracker, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2018), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/the-2018-congressional-retirement-
tracker/545723 [https://perma.cc/UUL6-8KYL]; Michael Tackett, Republican Retirements 
Raise Talk of Democratic Wave in November, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2018), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/us/politics/republicans-retirements-house-democrats-
wave-2018.html. 
99. See Seth Masket, The Sheer Number of Democrats Running for Congress Is a Good Sign for 
the Party, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 17, 2017, 5:51 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/ 
features/the-sheer-number-of-democrats-running-for-congress-is-a-good-sign-for-the-
party [https://perma.cc/G5HC-RSKE]. 
100. See Edward-Isaac Dovere, ‘Run for Something’ Backs Dozens of Progressive Candidates, 
POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2017, 1:01 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/17/run-for-
something-backs-dozens-of-progressive-candidates-243867 [https://perma.cc/VM2J-8WZH]; 
RUN FOR SOMETHING, http://runforsomething.net [https://perma.cc/YW3H-AQAL]. 
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presidency.”101  Given their control of all three branches of the federal 
government, Republicans have accomplished remarkably little thus far in 
Trump’s tenure, and those accomplishments they can point to—judicial 
appointments and tax cuts, primarily102—are the sorts of things any Republican 
leaders would have done.  In short, the perception that President Trump is an 
extraordinary norm flouter has helped fuel an extraordinary pushback, which 
has had significant success.103 
It is, of course, too early to tell how the remainder of Trump’s presidency 
will play out.  If Trump is reelected, certain constitutional norms might well be 
upended in the process, although this would depend on a close reading of how 
he actually behaves in his second term and what effects that behavior has.  At 
this writing, however, the evidence surveyed in this Part suggests that many 
of the constitutional norms Trump has tried to destroy may emerge not just 
intact but stronger for it. 
By contrast, some of the norm decomposition transpiring in Congress and 
in state legislatures has generated less public pushback and—partly for that very 
reason—likely poses the more serious threat to our constitutional future.  As we 
argued in Parts II and III, the line between norm adherence and norm 
decomposition is irreducibly a matter of interpretation, and every norm is 
subject to walking that line.  But even still, there is a case to be made that various 
constitutional norms are in the process of unraveling in especially worrisome 
ways that have little to do with President Trump.  Or rather, the decomposition 
of these norms predates and to some extent helps explain Trump’s political 
ascent; he is more symptom than cause of the democratic decay it reflects.104 
  
101. Matthew Glassman, Donald Trump Is a Dangerously Weak President, VOX (Dec. 27, 2017), 
http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/12/4/16733450/donald-trump-weak-president-
neustadt [https://perma.cc/W36Z-XL9X]; see also Corey Robin, If Authoritarianism Is 
Looming in the US, How Come Donald Trump Looks So Weak?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2018), 
http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/commentisfree/2018/ jan/13/ american-democracy-
peril- trump-power [https://perma.cc/J79J-RFG2]. 
102. See, e.g., Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017); Fishkin 
& Pozen, supra note 9, at 982 n.266 (“Perhaps the most unifying action [President Trump] 
has taken to date—the action that most appeals to the disparate strands of the Republican 
coalition—is . . . pushing through ideologically conservative judicial nominees, in 
particular Justice Gorsuch, under the banner of constitutional restorationism.”). 
103. See Max Boot, America Is Resisting Trump’s Onslaught. Just Don’t Get Cocky., WASH. POST 
(Feb. 7, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/america-is-
resisting-trumps-onslaught-just-dont-get-cocky/2018/02/07/d75f5c5a-0c21-11e8-8890-
372e2047c935_story.html [https://perma.cc/JU4T-4UKQ]. 
104. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot, in CAN IT HAPPEN HERE? AUTHORITARIANISM IN 
AMERICA 19, 27 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018) (describing the Trump presidency as “a 
symptom of constitutional rot and constitutional dysfunction”). 
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We do not have the space here to go into any detail, but among many 
possible candidates, we would highlight the decomposition over the past two or 
so decades of: (1) norms that foster respect for governmental expertise, whether 
in the context of OLC,105 the Congressional Budget Office,106 the Senate 
Parliamentarian,107 or elsewhere;108 (2) norms that proscribe certain forms of 
high-stakes brinksmanship, including debt-ceiling default;109 (3) norms that 
constrain the influence of lobbyists and donors on elected officials;110 and (4) 
norms that constrain legislative efforts to shape the electorate for partisan 
advantage.111  Each of these categories of norms is vital to sustaining fair and 
  
105. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Bruce Ackerman, Lost Inside the 
Beltway: A Reply to Professor Morrison, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 13 (2011) (decrying the 
“politicization” of OLC and the rise of the White House Counsel as an alternative source of 
interpretive guidance). 
106. See, e.g., Michael R. Strain, Stop Bashing the CBO, Republicans, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2017, 
4:30 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-08-01/stop-bashing-the-cbo-
republicans [https://perma.cc/Z56U-4L8U] (critiquing recent Republican efforts to 
discredit and defund the office). 
107. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 9, at 931, 939 n.99 (discussing Senate Republicans’ dismissal in 
2001 of their own hand-picked parliamentarian in response to a disfavored ruling). 
108. See, e.g., id. at 930 (noting Newt Gingrich’s maneuvers as Speaker of the House in the late 
1990s “to consolidate power in the Speaker’s office and ‘dismantle’ congressional 
institutions with professional staff” (quoting Bruce Bartlett, Gingrich and the Destruction 
of Congressional Expertise, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Nov. 29, 2011), http://economix. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/gingrich-and-the-destruction-of-congressional-expertise 
[https://perma.cc/MS6N-MZHV])); Kevin R. Kosar, The Struggle Between Objectivity vs. 
Neutrality Continues at the Congressional Research Service, LEGBRANCH (Feb. 13, 2018), 
http://www.legbranch.com/theblog/2018/2/11/the-struggle-between-objectivity-vs-
neutrality-continues-at-the-congressional-research-service [https://perma.cc/CPQ5-VQYN] 
(describing partisan threats since the 1990s to a range of legislative support agencies that 
“were established to add knowledge to the political process”). 
109. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 9, at 932–33, 947 n.123, 961 & n.184 (discussing debt-
ceiling brinksmanship in recent Congresses). 
110. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A 
PLAN TO STOP IT 99–107 (2011) (arguing that increasing pressure to raise money has 
coincided with “radically different congressional norms” on fundraising and lobbying over 
the past several decades); David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 265, 266–68 (2008) (describing the growing role of campaign expenditures in state 
court races and observing that, “[w]ith remarkable speed, the distinctive rules, norms, and 
politics of judicial elections have begun to disappear”). 
111. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 9, at 931 n.61 (“The post-2000 wave of Republican-
sponsored measures aiming to restrict voting in one way or another came as a surprise to 
voting rights scholars, who had generally assumed that ‘vote denial’ controversies were a 
thing of the past.”).  On the other side of the aisle, Republican officials have characterized 
certain Democratic governors’ attempts to circumvent felon disenfranchisement laws as 
norm decomposing.  See, e.g., Graham Moomaw, McAuliffe Restores Voting Rights for 
206K Ex-Felons; GOP Calls It Move to Boost Clinton, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Apr. 22, 
2016), http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/mcauliffe-restores-
voting-rights-for-k-ex-felons-gop-calls/article_771db279-34d6-5a3d-9557-
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effective constitutional governance.  Within each category, however, a complex 
chain of behaviors has arguably already drained pertinent norms of much of 
their regulative force.  And with some partial exceptions in areas such as 
gerrymandering, this has happened largely without triggering bipartisan 
condemnation, robust countermeasures, or sustained public debate. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought, primarily, to illuminate the structure of 
constitutional norm breakdown.  We have tried to show that distinguishing 
norm destruction from norm decomposition and appreciating the multiple 
axes of norm instability can go a long way toward clarifying how unwritten 
rules and conventions do and do not change over time.  Building on this 
conceptual framework, we have further argued that when one believes some 
existing constitutional norm to be desirable, in many cases—indeed in most 
cases—one ought to be more concerned about its being incrementally revised 
than about its being openly flouted.  And this, in turn, suggests a somewhat 
surprising lesson: President Trump’s most significant legacy for the evolution 
of constitutional norms may not be that he laid waste to so many of them, but 
rather that he obscured where the real normative decay was occurring.  Insofar 
as there is an economy of outrage in American politics and civil society, that 
economy strikes us as overly fixated on President Trump himself. 
If we are right about this, it would seem to counsel not only new forms of 
political mobilization but also a new focus for public law scholarship.  While 
perceived attempts to destroy constitutional norms will continue to demand 
(and, by their very nature, receive) critical attention, our analysis implies that 
constitutional scholars could bring their distinctive expertise to bear by 
identifying and explicating ongoing constitutional norm decompositions—a 
task that often requires significant historical perspective and institutional 
acumen.112  Given the inherent instability of such norms, scholars could add 
still more value by offering explicit normative critiques or defenses of particular 
formulations of the practices in question.  Dealing effectively with norm change 
  
a417a8afb212.html [https://perma.cc/DPN5-CC2R].  The fact that many committed 
citizens—ourselves included—find felon disfranchisement laws to be morally and 
democratically repugnant only proves our point in Part III about the limits of content-
independent analyses of norm breakdowns. 
112. For an important recent study in this mold, see generally Renan, supra note 18 
(documenting decomposition of the norm of “OLC supremacy”). 
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requires, for academics and activists alike, changing some of the ways we think 
and talk about norms. 
